The Impact of Corporate Practices on Health: Implications for Health Policy by Freudenberg, Nicholas & Galea, Sandro
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research CUNY Graduate School of Public Health & Health Policy 
2008 
The Impact of Corporate Practices on Health: Implications for 
Health Policy 
Nicholas Freudenberg 
CUNY School of Public Health 
Sandro Galea 
University of Michigan 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/sph_pubs/285 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
 The Impact of Corporate Practices on Health:
 Implications for Health Policy
 NICHOLAS FREUDENBERG1 and
 SANDRO GALEA*
 'Hunter College, Public Health, New York, NY, USA
 ^University of Michigan, Public Health, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
 Correspondence: Nicholas Freudenberg, Hunter College, Public Health, 425 East 25th Street,
 New York, NY 10010, US. E-mail: nfreuden@hunter.cuny.edu
 ABSTRACT
 Although corporate practices play a substantial role in shaping health and health
 behavior, public health researchers have rarely systematically studied these practices
 as a social determinant of health. We consider case studies of three products - trans
 fat, a food additive and a preservative; Vioxx, a pain killer; and sports utility
 vehicles - to illustrate the role of corporate policies and practices in the production
 of health and disease and the implications for health policy. In recent years, public
 health advocates, researchers, and lawyers have used strategies to reduce the adverse
 health impact of corporate practices. Systematic analysis of these experiences yields
 insights that can guide the development of health policies that increase opportunities
 for primary prevention by discouraging harmful corporate practices.
 Journal of Public Health Policy (2008) 29, 86-104.
 doi:io.iO57/palgrave.jphp.32OOi58
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 INTRODUCTION
 Recently, policy makers, the media, advocates, and the public have
 called attention to the impact of corporate activities on health and
 disease in the United States. High-profile cases that have galvanized
 public discourse include the tobacco settlement that was designed to
 provide compensation to states for tobacco-related illness, wide-
 spread debate over the responsibility of the food and beverage
 industry for the current epidemic of obesity, and discussions about
 drug company profits and harmful product side effects. Criminal
 prosecutions of corporate executives have posed new questions
 Journal of Public Health Policy 2008, 29, 86-104 © 2008 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 0197-5897/08 $30.00 .NJ/.
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 about corporate responsibility. Controversy about corporations and
 corporate practices has reignited a perennial American conflict
 regarding appropriate roles for government and markets in political
 life and in public health.
 Within public health, some have urged health professionals to
 engage corporations to improve health (i). Few public health
 commentators, however, have systematically examined corporate
 practices as social determinants of health or assessed their implica-
 tions for health policy. While researchers have examined the
 occupational and environmental health consequences of corporate
 policies (2), very little work has focused on the cumulative impact of
 consumer exposures to corporate policies. Current interest in the role
 of social determinants in shaping illness and health has focused
 on structural characteristics such as poverty, inequality, and racism
 (3-5). The research that has considered the impact of corporate activity
 on health has usually examined the health consequences of a single
 product or a corporate practice rather than the patterns of behavior by
 corporations and governments across a variety of industries.
 In our view, a systematic investigation of the impact of corporate
 decisions on health may yield insights that can guide prevention
 policy. In this review, we consider how fundamental factors such as
 the current relationship between markets and government influence
 corporate policies and in turn how these policies influence health
 behavior. Our primary interest is in corporate practices, defined as
 the business and political activities of corporations. These practices
 result from companies' decisions about the production, pricing,
 distribution, and promotion of their products and from their political
 efforts to create an environment favorable for their businesses. Our
 goals are to assess the role of corporate practices in determining
 health, examine their implications for health policy, and suggest
 directions for policy and research. More broadly, we hope to widen
 the discussion on social determinants to include corporate practices
 as a modifiable influence on population health.
 Recent literature on social and policy determinants of health
 (6-1 1 ) and the authors' ongoing research (12) informs this
 inquiry. Corporate practices can both benefit and harm health.
 Changes in food production and marketing in the first part of the
 20th century eliminated most malnutrition in the United States and
 products developed by the pharmaceutical industry have saved
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 millions of lives, as two examples. A better understanding of what
 leads a company or an industry to choose health-promoting vs.
 health-damaging practices may help to identify new opportunities
 for policies that encourage primary prevention.
 TRANS FATS, V/OXX, AND SPORTS UTILITY VEHICLES: THE
 IMPACT OF CORPORATE PRACTICES ON HEALTH
 To understand how corporate practices influence population
 health, we consider three products that have attracted recent media
 attention.
 Trans Fats
 In 1994, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a national
 advocacy organization, petitioned the Food and Drug Administra-
 tion (FDA) to require that food manufacturers label the trans fatty
 acid (trans fat) content of their food products. The petition was
 based on research showing that replacing trans fat with healthier oils
 could prevent 30,000-100,000 premature cardiovascular deaths in
 the United States each year (13,14). Some researchers have suggested
 that replacing trans fatty acids with healthier alternatives could
 reduce the incidence of Type 2 diabetes in the US by as much as 40%
 (15,16).
 Artificial trans fats are used to enhance the crispness, stability, and
 flavor of many processed foods (17). By the late 1990s, 40% of US
 supermarket products contained trans fats. When evidence of
 harmful effects began to emerge in the early 1990s, sectors of the
 food industry chose different responses. Some producers rejected the
 claim that trans fats were harmful and sought to delay any regulatory
 action by calling for further research (18). Throughout the 1990s,
 food industry groups opposed new FDA regulations on trans fats
 (19). Other companies, however, accepted the call for labeling and
 looked for ways to reduce the amount of trans fats so that their labels
 might show lower levels. Yet others, European food companies,
 moved to substitute safer ingredients for trans fats, demonstrating
 that companies might opt for health-enhancing practices (19).
 In 1999, despite the opposition of the food industry, the FDA
 proposed to require trans fatty acid content on the standard food
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 label. The agency claimed that strengthening food labeling was likely
 to yield significant health and economic benefits, saving as many as
 5,600 lives and $8 billion a year (20). Three years later, the US
 Institute of Medicine could not determine a healthful limit of trans
 fat and urged action to reduce its presence in the American diet (21).
 In January 2006, the FDA rule requiring trans fats content on food
 labels went into effect, but the FDA turned down requests to ban the
 additive altogether. More recently, several cities and states have
 banned trans fats in restaurant food.
 Vioxx
 Merck Pharmaceuticals obtained FDA approval to market the
 painkiller Vioxx (generic name, rofecoxib) in 1999. Merck market-
 ing promised that Vioxx would bring pain relief to people with
 arthritis without the gastrointestinal side effects associated with
 other medications. Five years later, after more than $10 billion in
 sales, Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market because a study
 showed that it doubled the risk of heart attacks and strokes in long-
 term users (22). By then, more than 20 million people had taken the
 drug and thousands may have experienced adverse events, including
 deaths, attributable to Vioxx (23).
 Why did so many people take a drug that turned out to be unsafe?
 First, Merck benefited from a drug-testing system that relied heavily
 on industry studies rather than independent review - a testing regime
 developed at the behest of a politically powerful industry (22,23).
 Second, Merck invested hundreds of millions of dollars in promoting
 Vioxx. In 1997, after a decade of pressure by the drug industry, the
 FDA issued guidelines that relaxed restrictions on advertising
 prescription drugs directly to consumers (24). By 2001, spending
 by pharmaceuticals on direct-to-consumer advertising had more than
 doubled (24). In 6 years, Merck spent more than $500 million
 advertising Vioxx to consumers (23) and in 2003 alone, more than
 $500 million on Vioxx ads for physicians (25).
 The company also developed an aggressive training program for
 its sales force. A training video told its sales representatives that the
 drug did not cause heart attacks and encouraged them to avoid
 questions on that topic (26). Merck's promotional campaigns and
 advertisements led many consumers and physicians to believe that
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 Vioxx and other COX-2 inhibitors (the class of drugs that includes
 Vioxx) were superior painkillers to much less expensive but equally
 effective over-the-counter alternatives (25).
 Faced with mounting evidence regarding the dangers of Vioxx, the
 FDA adopted a policy of watchful waiting (23), despite the fact that
 one FDA scientist estimated that Vioxx was associated with more
 than 27,000 heart attacks or deaths linked to cardiac problems (27).
 Finally, Merck ignored warning signs about cardiovascular side
 effects. Prior to FDA approval, for example, researchers discovered
 that COX-2 inhibitors interfere with enzymes that prevent cardio-
 vascular disease (22). Another study in 2000 found that people
 taking Vioxx had three times as many cardiovascular events as those
 taking Naproxen, another pain reliever. Merck attributed these
 results to the heart-protective effects of Naproxen rather than the
 harmful effects of Vioxx (22). Finally, after another study showed
 serious cardiovascular problems in those who had taken Vioxx for
 more than 18 months (27), Merck pulled the drug from the market.
 More recently, some researchers have accused Merck of misrepre-
 senting earlier safety trials that revealed harmful side effects
 associated with Vioxx use of less than 18 months (28).
 Sports Utility Vehicles
 From the early 1990s to 2005, sports utility vehicles (SUVs) were the
 best-selling and most profitable vehicles made by the US auto
 industry. SUVs are characterized by a pick-up truck underbody, high
 ground clearance, enclosed rear cargo area, and availability of four-
 wheel drive (29). SUVs, together with pick-up trucks and mini vans,
 are considered "light trucks", a category that has separate safety and
 fuel efficiency standards than passenger cars. By 2000, light trucks
 accounted for 40% of US motor vehicles, double the 1980 rate (30).
 SUVs pose several health and environmental problems. First,
 because of their high center of gravity, they are three times more
 likely to roll over and the rate of occupant fatalities in these rollovers
 is almost three times higher than for passenger cars (31). Second,
 because of their weight and design, SUVs are more likely than sedans
 to kill the occupants of cars and pedestrians they hit. An analysis of
 US traffic fatalities from 1995 to 2001 found that each SUV occupant
 fatality averted because of the greater weight comes at a cost of 4.3
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 additional crashes that involve deaths of car occupants, pedestrians,
 bicyclists, or motor cyclists (32). Third, SUVs are harder to steer,
 take longer to stop, and give their drivers a false sense of security that
 leads to riskier driving (29). Fourth, because of high fuel needs, SUVs
 produce more pollution than passenger cars, contributing to
 respiratory disease, cancer, and other conditions. SUVs also release
 up to 47% more CO2 than sedans (33), thus contributing to global
 warming (34).
 Based on a review of scientific and government reports, Bradsher
 estimated that SUVs account for roughly 3,000 annual excess deaths
 in the United States (29). Recent improvements in SUVs have
 reduced some hazards, although as older vehicles move into the
 second-hand market, characterized by riskier drivers and poorer
 maintenance, the SUV death toll may increase (35).
 SUVs came to the US auto market through an opportunity created
 by an exemption from new fuel efficiency standards, won by
 automakers in 1975. Since then, the auto industry has used its
 influence in Washington to oppose changes in fuel standards for
 SUVs and light trucks, despite the existence of technologies that
 could improve their efficiency (36). From 1996 to 2000, Congress
 passed budgets that prohibited spending any money on fuel-economy
 research (29), ensuring that no new evidence would be available to
 set new fuel standards.
 SUVs and pick-ups were the most profitable auto industry
 products because of trade protection against imported SUVs. Their
 simple design led to unit profits 10-12 times higher than for
 conventional cars. The auto industry, the nation's largest advertiser,
 also promoted SUVs heavily, spending more than $9 billion on SUV
 ads between 1990 and 2001 - ads wrongly suggesting that SUVs
 were safer than passenger cars (37). Once again, profitability
 trumped health, although in this case some analysts argue that US
 auto makers' short-term focus on profits actually harmed long-term
 profitability as changing economic conditions reduced the demand
 for SUVs (37).
 HOW CORPORATE PRACTICES INFLUENCE HEALTH
 These stories illustrate the ways in which specific corporate practices
 intended to achieve industry goals can result in actions that affect
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 population health. Corporate managers have made decisions that
 have contributed to tens of thousands of preventable deaths, injuries,
 and illnesses. But in each case, advocacy, government regulation, and
 market forces ultimately reduced the threat to population health. We
 suggest that the systematic investigation of how companies make
 decisions that affect health can help identify earlier opportunities for
 primary prevention, thus avoiding preventable deaths.
 For all three products, in the absence of safety evidence, corporate
 practices tried to maximize financial return. Adding trans fats to
 thousands of processed foods gave the food industry more flexibility
 in retail markets (e.g., longer shelf lives) while magnifying
 cardiovascular risk for consumers. For Vioxx and SUVs, aggressive
 advertising of unsafe products increased the population exposed,
 amplifying negative impacts on health.
 In each case, industries conducted extensive public relations and
 lobbying campaigns, and went to court to defeat or delay
 government regulation, extending both the period of profitability
 and adverse health impacts. Finally, Ford, General Motors, Merck,
 and major food companies paid scientists to conduct research to
 support their positions, contributing to doubt about the evidence
 that many public health experts believed justified regulation to
 protect health.
 If trans fat, Vioxx, and SUVs were aberrations, they would be
 alarming but less worthy of analysis. Recent scientific and popular
 work suggests, however, that corporations regularly make decisions
 that adversely affect health and that their practices have a substantial
 impact on US mortality and morbidity (21,29,38-42). For example,
 the tobacco and alcohol industries target advertising at young people
 and heavy users, increasing the harm to health (43,44). The food
 industry modifies its products by increasing portion size (45) and
 adding sweeteners and fats, (46,47) contributing to obesity and
 diabetes. The tobacco, automobile, and firearm industries make
 campaign contributions, lobby, and go to court to prevent the
 government from passing stricter safety standards for their products
 (36,48,49).
 The role of corporations in our daily lives and in the governance of
 the United States has increased. Between the 1992 and 2004
 elections, campaign contributions from the pharmaceutical and the
 food and beverage industries doubled (50). Between 1998 and 2005,
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 food stores' spending on lobbying increased fivefold and pharma-
 ceutical manufacturers tripled their spending (50). Since 2000, the
 number of registered lobbyists in Washington has doubled (51),
 providing corporations with increased contact with policy makers and
 greater opportunity to influence legislation. Between 1975 and 2001,
 total US spending on advertising as a percentage of gross domestic
 product more than doubled (52). Corporations have also penetrated
 more sectors of public life, for example, schools and other public
 places have become important sites for advertising (53), providing
 greater opportunities to promote health-damaging behavior.
 In the political sphere, as a result of increased lobbying and
 campaign contributions, many areas of public health oversight have
 been deregulated and the staff available to monitor industry practices
 has been reduced (54-56). At the behest of lobbyists, 22 states have
 banned obesity-related liability lawsuits against fast food restaurants
 (57), and in its first term, the Bush Administration dropped 31 of 85
 proposed auto safety rules from the National Highway and Auto
 Safety Administration's agenda (56).
 In the personal sphere, increased advertising has doubled the
 number of television commercials viewed each year by the average
 American child, from about 20,000 in 1970 to 40,000 in 2000 (58).
 Advertisements for obesogenic processed foods are the most
 common television ads aimed at children (59). Increasingly, major
 corporations like McDonald's and Starbucks provide a place
 away from home and work where people can socialize and consume
 high-fat products (60).
 CORPORATE PRACTICES AND THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF
 POPULATION HEALTH
 In past decades, health researchers have disagreed about the most
 important causes of morbidity and mortality and therefore about
 prevention priorities. The dominant view in the United States is that
 individual behavior and lifestyle are the primary malleable determi-
 nants of health (61,62), suggesting that the goal of policy is to change
 harmful behaviors. Some US and European researchers, however,
 argue that social structures and the distribution of wealth and power
 are the fundamental causes of disease, and that changes in these
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 factors are needed to achieve improvement in population health
 (10,11,63,64).
 In our view, a focus on corporate behavior provides common
 ground for these two approaches. It suggests a policy paradigm that
 aims to encourage corporate practices that promote healthy
 behavior. As corporate practices result from specific decisions,
 they may be more readily changed than underlying social and
 economic structures in which they are embedded. They offer more
 immediate opportunities for health promotion than those available
 to change more entrenched structures. While it is true that
 corporations, like individuals, make decisions constrained by the
 social and economic context, identifying policies that make it easier
 for corporations to choose health should be a public health priority.
 Strong national standards on pollution control, for example,
 would make it easier for automakers to produce for the national
 market rather than separately meet California's more stringent
 requirements (36).
 To shift the focus of public health policy from individual behavior
 to corporate practices will require an elucidation of the pathways by
 which corporate decisions structure the context in which individuals
 choose behaviors and products. To illustrate, few individuals decide,
 "Today, I am going to consume an extra-large portion of high
 fructose corn syrup" (a sweetener linked to obesity and diabetes) or
 "I'm going to buy a polluting vehicle more likely to kill or injure my
 neighbors." Rather, these choices are made in a marketplace that
 produces and advertises certain options and suppresses others and
 within a political system where certain stakeholders hold more
 power and influence than others.
 In order to increase opportunities for primary prevention, two
 changes are needed: a re-conceptualization of "lifestyle" and a
 focused policy agenda that makes it easier for corporate managers to
 choose health-promoting practices.
 BEYOND LIFESTYLE
 Historically, health researchers have regarded lifestyle as the sum
 of behavioral choices in multiple arenas (e.g., diet, tobacco,
 physical activity), influenced by underlying personal characteris-
 tics (e.g., orientation to risk, self-efficacy) (65,66). However,
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 sociologists from Weber on have seen lifestyle as a socially
 determined pattern of consumption or marker of status (67,68). By
 regarding lifestyle as the consequence of socially constructed choices,
 it is possible to identify policies that will facilitate healthier life-
 style options.
 Free market proponents argue that individuals should have the
 right to choose what they consume without interference from a
 "nanny state" (69), suggesting that lifestyle choices are made in a
 vacuum. In fact, lifestyle choices are often the direct result of
 corporate decisions. No consumer ever entered a restaurant
 demanding a portion of trans fats. Rather, food companies constrain
 consumer options through decisions made primarily to increase
 profits. By exposing corporations as the the real "nannies" who
 persuade children to eat to obesity, drivers to find their inner id
 behind the wheel, or patients to solve their social problems with a
 new drug, health professionals can reframe the discussion about who
 can be trusted to look after the public's health.
 Traditional market proponents have accepted that government has
 some right to intervene in markets: for example, to ensure that
 consumers have information to make informed choices, to protect
 vulnerable groups such as children, or to return unintended costs of a
 product ("externalities") from tax payers to producers. Recently,
 however, more ardent-free market advocates have challenged even
 these roles, a position some label "market fundamentalism" (70). By
 encouraging more discussion on these issues, health professionals
 may be able to reframe policy debates to lead to decisions that better
 protect health.
 A POLICY AGENDA FOR HEALTH PROMOTING CORPORATE
 PRACTICES
 Public health advocates have for the most part sought reforms
 governing corporate practices one product, company, or industry at a
 time. They have advocated strategies, including public education, to
 enable individual consumers to make more informed choices (71)
 and legal mandates to label products truthfully (72,73), on the
 premise that consumers have a right to know (74); and taxation
 of tobacco, alcohol, and high-calorie, low-nutrient foods (75-78)
 in order to make them less available. Others have suggested
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 banning products like flavored cigarettes, designed to appeal to young
 people (79), or food advertisements for children (80) or requiring
 higher fuel and safety standards for SUVs in order to reduce their
 harmful impact (81).
 Some advocates have switched from legislative to litigation
 strategies. Consumer lawsuits have targeted many corporations.
 Many believe that litigation is particularly effective in getting
 corporate attention. Beginning with the lawsuits against Big Tobacco
 in the 1970s, a cadre of lawyers has emerged and shared lessons from
 their battles against alcohol, automobile, food, gun, pharmaceutical,
 and tobacco industries (82-84). Public health litigators assert that
 courts are an important arena in which to seek justice, educate the
 public, win resources for health promotion, and force companies to
 change corporate practices by returning externalized costs to their
 balance sheets.
 While each of these strategies has produced some significant
 public health advances, in the long run, this piecemeal approach
 seems inadequate to the task of promoting population health and
 realizing opportunities for primary prevention. Just as researchers
 and advocates in the occupational and environmental health fields
 have called for moving beyond regulation of a single substance at a
 time, often only after a body count has demonstrated damage
 (85,86), public health policy makers concerned about corporate
 practices need to consider a more comprehensive approach.
 A broader agenda could serve to unify many disparate strands of
 current advocacy, bring together a more cohesive and powerful
 coalition to advocate in the political arena, and help reframe public
 debate in more favorable terms. Such an agenda would use language
 and concepts that appeal to many Americans (87,88) and provide
 links to other major public issues such as campaign finance and
 electoral reform, reduction of corporate crime, health care coverage,
 and consumer protection.
 While the specifics of such a policy agenda can only be forged by
 key stakeholders - policy makers, public health professionals,
 advocacy organizations, and citizens - we suggest one approach in
 order to stimulate discussion.
 1. Provide consumers with a right to know the health consequences
 of legal products and companies with a duty to disclose such
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 information. Free market ideology assumes that all parties to
 commercial transactions have equal information; however, in
 practice, "buyer beware" is a common experience. Extending the
 right to know and the duty to disclose to consumer products
 beyond the weak protections now offered could provide a legal
 framework for re-defining consumer rights and better balancing
 the obligations of government and markets. By making it more
 difficult for producers to externalize the health costs of their
 products, it might be possible to change the decision-making
 process by which corporate managers now opt for harmful
 practices.
 2. Protect children and other vulnerable populations against targeted
 advertising that promotes unhealthy behavior. Most Americans
 oppose such marketing and many other free market nations
 restrict such practices. National legislation to protect children
 could encourage debate on the costs and benefits of recent efforts
 to extend free speech protection to commercial speech (89,90) and
 unify advocacy across several industries.
 3. Support measures to level the political playing field. Meaningful
 campaign finance reform, higher ethical standards for elected
 officials, more stringent oversight of lobbying, and stronger voter
 rights will help to make it easier for public health advocates to
 gain electoral, legislative, or litigation support for health-promot-
 ing policies and to encourage healthier corporate practices. To
 date, organized public health has rarely made support of such
 reforms a priority.
 4. Increase sanctions for deliberate distortions of science designed
 to protect corporate interests. Industry campaigns to with-
 hold damaging scientific data and to create scientific uncertainty
 have hampered efforts to protect public health. By increasing
 professional, academic, and legal sanctions for such action, it may
 be possible to make it easier for scientists to resist such pressures.
 5. Such an agenda could significantly strengthen fragmented
 approaches to encouraging healthier corporate practices, provide
 a coherent alternative to market advocates who seek to diminish
 the public role in health, and support the emergence of a social
 movement that seeks to re-define corporate responsibility (1).
 Such movements have been the foundation for previous public
 health advances.
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 CONCLUSION
 In summary, we argue that corporate practices are an important
 determinant of health, and those policies that alter damaging
 corporate practices are likely to improve population health. In
 recent years, public health advocates have developed strategies
 to bring about policy changes, efforts often opposed by industry
 and its supporters. A systematic study of both these domains will
 inform more effective public health policy and practice. In the
 current political climate, these proposals may seem idealistic,
 even naive. In a society that seeks to protect public health, they
 are common sense.
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